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BEFORE THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
Evaluation of conduct by
Justice of the Ontario Superior Court
Rick Leroy
Posted by Colin Alexander
Introduction
This foreword may be necessary because of the tradition that one may not impugn a judge’s motive however egregious the conduct subject to criticism. Without imputing motive, therefore, I invite consideration of what Justice of the Superior Court Rick Leroy did when processing a Motion before his court. This evaluation states the case that the facts and the law stand independently of motive. That’s so even as in many other situations (such as prosecution for a hate crime) motive may be directly relevant.
Everything stated here is based on fact, and is believed to be true in its entirety. It comprises fair comment on the facts and publication is in the public interest. It may be apposite to quote Lord Chief Justice Russell in R v Grey:[1]
Judges and Courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable argument or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good, no Court could or would treat that as contempt of Court.
In a more recent case of contempt of court, Lord Denning accepted this settled law, adding, “We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.”[2] But what if vindication is not justifiable? Lord Denning went on to say this:
Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction as a means to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. It is the right of every man, in Parliament or out of it, in the Press or over the broadcast, to make fair comment, even outspoken comment, on matters of public interest. Those who comment can deal faithfully with all that is done in a court of justice.
This evaluation arises from the Motion I brought before Justice Rick Leroy seeking to dislodge the evidently usurped appointment of William L. Neville as arbitrator. Leroy denied the Motion. As set out below, the textbooks and case law support the proposition that it was fraudulent misrepresentation under Section 380 of the Criminal Code for lawyer Keith A. MacLaren and arbitrator William L. Neville to assert that arbitration was obligatory, They relied on an ostensible 1960 Agreement to Arbitrate which, as set out below, was a nullity in law. It follows that by denying the Motion to dump Neville, Leroy endorsed the ongoing perpetration of criminal fraud by his fellow court officers. So what? This presentation addresses that question.
As set out in the Appendix describing the unsatisfactory circumstances of the hearing, Leroy awarded massively punitive costs to his fellow court officer MacLaren for its five-minute duration.
Background
I was one of two unrepresented Ottawa homeowners in a four-block who contested a claim for some three thousand dollars. We were objecting to the bill for replacing our common water and sewer pipe to the City mains said to have been charged by fifty percent above the price quoted by contractors Bradley Kelly. Neighbour Michael Dagg took it upon himself to pay the bill in full without authorization. Then he wanted a prorated share of all he’d paid out. The next year he needed work for his personal benefit, and the same contractors discounted the price by an amount approximately equalling that overcharge!
Instead of going to Small Claims Court with its filing fee of just $75, Dagg hired Keith A. MacLaren, lawyer at Perley Robertson & McDougall, to set arbitration in motion on the basis of an ostensible Agreement to Arbitrate signed by the previous property owners half a century earlier, in 1960. In order to secure his own evidently usurped appointment, arbitrator Neville repeated this assertion, which violated the applicable textbooks and case law. By extension, therefore, this Information states the case that it was criminally fraudulent to say that arbitration was obligatory.
Having been induced to believe the falsehood that we had no other option, we signed the contract for Neville’s services. He then demanded advance payment of $5,000 for his own fees. He said he would charge least ten grand to deliver a decision. In due course the make-work-and-gouging operation led to total costs of one hundred thousand dollars in legal fees.
In addition to the duty of honesty for salesmen set out in Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act, with its provisions for criminal prosecution of fraud, a Canadian template is Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co.[3] That case was about the company failing to provide information necessary for the customer to make an informed decision as to what level of insurance to buy. The court ruled that reasonable reliance on information provided by someone selling goods or services can ground a duty of care in tort that binds the provider of the information. The Court said:
In many cases where a misrepresentation has been made to another person, particularly by a professional man acting in the course of his profession, the assumption of responsibility may be readily inferred.
Readers may find it helpful to consider what MacLaren and Neville did in the context of a civil case for fraud. In Small Claims Court, Deputy Judge Ivan Whitehall found fraud by a car dealer.[4] (Whitehall was also the so-called case manager in the civil action against/Neville for fraud—its own exercise in protecting a fellow court officer from the consequences of fraud.) Without telling the buyer of prior damage, the dealer had sold a car as new that turned out to have needed serious repairs to make it look new: Whitehall said in his decision:
Silence and half-truths can amount to fraudulent misrepresentation. Mrs. Lefrançois was misled by the defendants’ failure to divulge the previous accident. The duty may be breached not only by positive misstatements but also by omissions, for they may be just as misleading.
The eventual civil case in Small Claims Court against Neville for fraud died by attrition after it became evident that judges, even at the highest levels, were circling wagons around their fellow court officers, with specious handling of the facts and the law.
What MacLaren and Neville wrote
Leroy had before him MacLaren’s initiating letter, which said this:
According to the terms of the Co-Tenancy Agreement dated February 1st, 1960, which is registered on title and is therefore binding on the neighbours … The Co-Tenancy Agreement requires you to respond to this Notice Requiring Arbitration within ten (10) days. If you do not respond, our arbitrator may hear the arbitration and make an award under S. 50 of the Arbitration Act, which can be enforced as if it was a judgment of a court.
Although not relevant for the core issue, it’s simply not true to say that registration on title, of itself, means anything at all. Supporting the assertion that arbitration was obligatory, Neville wrote this:
Those who purchased the units of the Original Parties are assignees of the Original Parties and “stand in the shoes” of the Original Parties: they are bound, in other words, by the election [of the 1960 Agreement] that Clause 8 created.
The foundational assertion here is that these representations were false and that they meet the criteria for prosecution under Section 380 of the Criminal Code:
(1) Every one who, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretence within the meaning of this Act, defrauds the public or any person … of any … money … is guilty of an indictable offence …
The prerequisites for arbitration
Now follow the reasons why the ostensible 1960 was invalid in law and, by extension, that MacLaren and Neville were lying in order to induce the contract for Neville’s services. (On the ancient principle of fraus omnia corrumpit—fraud negates all that follows—everything else is extraneous.)
The textbook Arbitration Law of Canada, by J. Brian Casey, states the following points:
1. The essence of arbitration is that it is consensual.
2. Ordinary contract law applies to determine whether or not there is an arbitration agreement. There must be an offer and an acceptance in circumstances in which the parties are ad idem (all on the same page).
3. [T]he arbitration agreement is a contract between the parties and is governed by the ordinary principles of contract law.
4. An arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to do anything unless it is fully and properly constituted.
Casey’s textbook contradicts, very specifically, what MacLaren and Neville wrote;
It must be remembered that the arbitral tribunal takes its power solely from the agreement between the parties. If it is shown that there is no agreement by reason [that] the agreement has ceased to exist, then there is no consensual basis for the arbitration. … For consensus ad idem the arbitration agreement must be signed by the present parties. … A tribunal has no jurisdiction to do anything until it is duly and properly constituted.
It follows that the 1960 Agreement expired when the signatories sold their respective properties, and the current owners did not stand in the shoes of those signatories.
Requirements for a valid contract
Proceeding from Casey’s Point 3, in the textbook used by the Supreme Court of Canada, The Law of Contract,[5] G.H. Treitel says this about the requirements for a valid contract:
The doctrine of privity means that a contract, as a general rule, cannot confer rights or impose obligations arising under it on any person except the parties to it. The rule that no one except a party to a contract can be made liable under it is generally regarded as just and sensible.
Here’s an example of this point in practice. Under contract law and the principle of privity of contract, your neighbour can’t bind his son to paint your house without his son agreeing to do the job on terms he personally agrees to. Casey says several times, with variations in wording, that to be enforceable an arbitration agreement must be signed by the present parties.
Covenants and easements law
Covenants (agreements) registered on the land title come in two flavours—affirmative (positive) and negative. A negative covenant could forbid the blocking of a view or disturbance of a power line, and it carries forward to the next owners of property. An affirmative covenant binds only these who signed it. It can require, of those signatories only, some kind of expenditure, like maintaining a fence or, as in this case, submitting to arbitration. Property Law 101 covers covenants and easements for every law student. A recent case before Ontario’s Court of Appeal, Amberwood,[6] addressed this issue. The future Supreme Court Justice Louise Charron carried forward this long-established principle of Law:
In Parkinson,[7] Cartwright J [in the Supreme Court of Canada] quoted Gale on Easements, 12th ed. at p. 77:
The [1848] rule in Tulk v. Moxhay does not extend to affirmative covenants requiring the expenditure of money or the doing of some act. Such covenants do not run with the land either at law or in equity.
In Sport Maska,[8] the Supreme Court’s Justice L’Heureux Dubé J had earlier confirmed the law stated by Casey and Justice Charron:
Two stages are therefore required: first, the parties promise to resort to arbitration if a dispute arises, and second, when the dispute does arise, they conclude a submission in the proper form.
Justice L’Heureux Dubé explained that you can’t have a valid second step without having the first one already in place.
As a final clincher on this point, the Arbitration Act of Ontario says in its introduction: “This Act applies to an arbitration conducted under an arbitration agreement.” It follows that nothing falls within the purview of the Act without a prerequisite arbitration agreement in good standing.
In Nadon, the Supreme Court confirmed the principle, so obvious it should not have to be said, that the absence of prerequisite credentials negates, from the outset, the appointment of a judge, or anyone else come to that.[9]
The conclusion on this point is clear that there never was a valid and binding Agreement to Arbitrate. MacLaren and Neville bamboozled unrepresented homeowners into believing the falsehood that arbitration was obligatory and then coercing them to contract for Neville’s abusive services. Whatever the motive, the classic reasonable outsider may conclude that, by rejecting the Motion to dump Neville, Leroy, did in fact use the power of the court to shield fellow court officers from the consequences of their fraud.
The Supreme Court on breach of trust
Under all normal circumstances, judges have carte blanche to do whatever they please—judicial immunity—however pernicious and unruly their conduct. But what if, as suggested here, a judge endorses criminal fraud by fellow court officers? Here’s case law potentially applicable to this point, from Lord Denning, in Sirros:[10]
Of course, if the judge has accepted bribes or been in the least degree corrupt, or has perverted the course of justice, he can be punished in the criminal courts.
It may be relevant to consider here a common law principle formerly applicable to all citizens but still applicable to public servants, including judges. The old common law offence of misprision of a felony still requires public servants to take appropriate action upon observing a crime. Though rarely invoked, a relatively recent case in England led to the conviction of police office Dytham, for standing by when he saw a bouncer kicking a customer to death. This is what Lord Chief Justice Widgery said when delivering judgment:[11]
The allegation made was not of mere non-feasance but of deliberate failure and wilful neglect. This involves an element of culpability which is not restricted to corruption or dishonesty but which must be of such a degree that the misconduct impugned is calculated to injure the public interest so as to call for condemnation and punishment.
Dytham’s motive was not at issue. The issue at hand is also whether Leroy’s conduct, of itself, withstands scrutiny. Assuming then the actuality of criminal fraud, our classic reasonable outsider may also need to consider this section of the Criminal Code as it relates specifically to a holder of a judicial office:
119 (1) Every one is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years who
(a) being the holder of a judicial office … directly or indirectly, corruptly accepts, obtains … for … another person, any money, valuable consideration … respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by them in their official capacity …
Coming back to Dytham, there’s the Supreme Court’s related ruling In R. v. Boulanger.[12] The charge of breach of trust by a public officer was laid under Section 122 of the Criminal Code. Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin said:
I conclude that the offence of breach of trust by a public officer will be established where the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements:
1. The accused is an official;
2. The accused was acting in connection with the duties of his or her office;
3. The accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of him or her by the nature of the office;
4. The conduct of the accused represented a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of an individual in the accused’s position of public trust; and
5. The accused acted with the intention to use his or her public office for a purpose other than the public good, for example, for a dishonest, partial, corrupt, or oppressive purpose.
Points 1 to 4 hardly need discussion. Point 5 invites consideration of its two points separately:
1. Assuming the foundational fraud, did Leroy execute a dishonest, partial, corrupt and oppressive act by endorsing its continuation by his fellow court officers?
2. Assuming an affirmative answer on the first point, did Leroy act with Intent?
The law of accomplice to crime may be helpful, so that potentially applicable is Section 23 (1) of the Criminal Code:
An accessory after the fact to an offence is one who, knowing that a person has been a party to the offence,, receives, comforts or assists that person for the purpose of enabling that person to escape.
On the issue of accountability as an accessory, the case in the Supreme Court of R. v. Briscoe[13] seems relevant. The issue was whether a young man present during the brutal rape and murder of a thirteen-year-old girl was an accessory to the crime. Finding that he was, Justice Charron said:
Professor Don Stuart makes the useful observation that the expression “deliberate ignorance” seems more descriptive than “willful blindness”, as it connotes “an actual process of suppressing a suspicion”. Properly understood in this way, “the concept of willful blindness is of narrow scope and involves no departure from the subjective focus on the workings of the accused’s mind” (Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (5th ed. 2007), at p. 241). While a failure to inquire may be evidence of recklessness or criminal negligence, as for example, where a failure to inquire is a marked departure from the conduct expected of a reasonable person, willful blindness is not simply a failure to inquire but, to repeat Professor Stuart’s words, “deliberate ignorance”.
The Bembridge case
In Boulanger, the Chief Justice also carried forward from Bembridge Lord Mansfield’s landmark consolidation of the principles of accountability and command responsibility for a public officer. Now follow the available comments on that case, with its directly reported quotations from the Decision:[14]
Lord Mansfield said ‘Here there are two principles applicable: first, that a man accepting an office of trust concerning the public, especially if attended with profit, is answerable criminally to the King for misbehaviour in his office; this is true, by whomsoever and in whatsoever way the officer is appointed . . secondly, where there is a breach of trust, fraud or imposition, in a matter concerning the public, though as between individuals it would only be actionable, yet as between the King and the subject it is indictable. That such should be the rule is essential to the existence of the country’.
In 1783 Charles Bembridge, an accountant, was accused of concealing the embezzlement of £48,000 by the former paymaster of the army, Henry Fox afterwards Lord Holland. Bembridge well knew that divers sums of money were misplaced, but his defence was that it was not in his place to turn a spy against his former boss and friend.
With the following direct quotation, Lord Mansfield clarified the boundaries of public office so as to exclude the defence of collegiality: “If a man accepts an office of trust and confidence concerning the public, he is answerable to the king for the execution of that office.
“I take the principle to be this, which appears to be recognized in cases without number, that is, that wherever a man’s business has a public aspect, and an improper conduct in it injures not A, B, or C but the community in general that that in itself is indictable by the common law; I take that to be a principle laid down over and over. … Where an officer neglects a duty incumbent on him, either by common law or statute, he is, for his default, indictable. … If we were to look in any commonplace book, under the head of non-feazance in any public officer, we should find there a common set of principles; that where a man misbehaves, does that which he ought not to do, or omits that which he ought to do in any public station, the proper remedy is by indictment or information.
“In 2 Lutwyche 1523, Wilkes versus Kirby, it is said
that, even if a man has a port belonging to him, and if he didn’t not repair
it, that he may be indicted for not doing it, because it concerns the public
...
“Some of the most important offices in the kingdom—some that are now, that
always were, and are like to continue places during pleasure, during the
pleasure of the crown, at least; if anyone ever hear that a judge was not
impeachable or punishable for misbehaviour, before the statute of King William
gave him tenure in his office? Or that it altered, in any degree, his
responsibility to the public for that which was improper conduct? Can anyone
contend that there is any difference in that situation now and what it was then;
or in the situation in the office I unworthily hold, that if I misbehave in my
office, because I am removable at pleasure, that I am not responsible?
“Is the great criminal jurisdiction of this country, that resides and exists in this court, to sit still and see such a fraud committed? The gentlemen seem to me to have totally forgotten all that relates to fraud; a private mischief is done, a private loss is sustained, but the fraud is the crime …
“As to the motion that this is in arrest of judgment, the objection is that this is a civil injury, and not indictable and there is no precedent. The law does not consist of particular cases but of general principles, which are illustrated and explained by these cases. Here there are two principles applicable: first, that a man accepting of an office of trust concerning the public, especially if attended with profit, is answerable criminally to the King for misbehaviour in his office; this is true by whomever and by whatever way the officer is appointed …
“He was arraigned for not acting honestly for that which was in his power to do. … He was to take all necessary pains to inform himself and, being informed, as an honest man, he was bound to debit that paymaster with every just charge, and give him credit for every just allowance …”
The court sentenced Bembridge to six months imprisonment and a fine of £2,650—his total gross emoluments and equivalent to several million dollars today.
Note Lord Mansfield’s point that even he as Lord Chief Justice could be held accountable in the criminal courts. Paraphrasing Lord Mansfield for this evaluation: Was Leroy to stand by and see MacLaren’s and Neville’s fraud committed?
To recap, Lord Mansfield wrapped up with this:
He [Bembridge] was arraigned for not acting honestly for that which was in his power to do. … He was to take all necessary pains to inform himself and, being informed, as an honest man, he was bound to debit that paymaster with every just charge, and give him credit for every just allowance …”
So did Leroy have all he needed in front of him in order to act on what was in his power to do? How could he have needed any more than the correspondence from MacLaren and Neville quoted above? Why didn’t he evaluate the facts and the law in the context of his professional experience before appointment to the bench? He had been a partner in the Morrisburg law firm of Gorrell, Grenkie, Leroy and Remillard. His practice included contract law, real estate law and—notably—alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The classic reasonable outsider seems certain to hold that he knew full well the prerequisites for a lawful arbitration to which he turned a blind eye..
Both J.O. Wilson, author of A Book for Judges, and Beverley G. Smith, author of Professional Conduct for Lawyers and Judges endorse Lord Hewart’s age-old principle: in the dictum of the Lord Chief Justice in Sussex Justices:[15]
[A] long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. …
Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice.
Given the foregoing requirements for a judge, the classic reasonable outsider may conclude that Leroy rode roughshod over his own duty of honesty and trust, with the practical effect of shielding fellow court officers from the consequences of their fraud.
Conclusion
Reduced to basics, there are these questions:
1. Do you find that MacLaren’s and Neville’s representations, that arbitration was obligatory, meet the criteria of Section 380 of the Criminal Code?
2. If so, how do you find Leroy’s conduct with respect to the criminal common law and the cited sections of the Criminal Code set out above?
Appendix I
Leroy’s handling of the hearing
MacLaren’s conflicted representation
Instead of Neville defending the contract for his own services and his own financial interest, MacLaren took up the cause of defending Neville’s cause despite the fact that he was also representing the party whose claim Neville was to adjudicate.
The classic reasonable outsider may question how on earth Leroy, acting as MacLaren’s lapdog, permitted in his court the two conflicting interests that MacLaren had taken upon himself. The outsider may ask these questions:
1. Why didn’t Neville recuse himself upon being told he was unacceptable as arbitrator, with his unacceptability expressly manifested in the precontractual exchanges and then in the Motion to remove him?
2. Why didn’t Neville arrange for his own independent representation to oppose the Motion to remove him?
3. By what standards of propriety could it ever be acceptable for a lawyer to represent the interests of an arbitrator so that he could stay on the job to adjudicate a claim by his own client?
4. How could it ever be acceptable for a judge to legitimize in his own court such conflicted representation when a self-representing litigant confronts a lawyer from a powerful law firm?
The Code of Conduct for a judge sets out the duty to prevent an unfair disadvantage to self-represented persons. This is a proactive requirement and not merely a discretionary option allowing a judge to favour a fellow court officer and to put the boots to an unrepresented litigant.
The punitive costs award
MacLaren claimed to have incurred costs of $7,000 for his document dump and his appearance on Neville’s behalf at Leroy’s adjourned five-minute non-hearing. That’s more than the return airfare by business class between Ottawa and Sydney, Australia.
On the basis of costs MacLaren claimed to have incurred, and without questioning the amount, Leroy awarded costs on the basis of 50 percent indemnity.
Senior partner at Barnes Sammon, Bruce Simpson, said a student could have put together MacLaren’s document dump in a morning. He said a maximal reasonable amount of costs actually incurred should have been of the order of one thousand dollars. A 50 percent indemnity would then have come in at $500, not the punitive $3,500 with which Leroy rewarded his fellow court officer.
It happens all too often that Canadian judges award punitive costs against those they dislike, especially self-representing litigants, and reward friends and fellow court officers accordingly.
Later Dagg boasted that this hearing cost him nothing because MacLaren docketed only $3,500. So was MacLaren’s claim for costs fraudulent?
Appendix II
A judge’s duty
Article I. Under the heading, The Qualities Required of a Judge, the
Canadian Superior Court Judges Association says this:
The judge is "the pillar of our entire justice system," the Supreme Court of Canada has said, and the public has a right to demand "virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function." Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their professional and personal lives. They should be knowledgeable about the law, willing to undertake in-depth legal research, and able to write decisions that are clear and cogent. Their judgment should be sound and they should be able to make informed decisions that will stand up to close scrutiny. Judges should be fair and open-minded, and should appear to be fair and open-minded. They should be good listeners but should be able, when required, to ask questions that get to the heart of the issue before the court. They should be courteous in the courtroom but firm when it is necessary to rein in a rambling lawyer, a disrespectful litigant or an unruly spectator.
The foregoing passage puts flesh on the bones of Magna Carta, signed eight hundred years ago: “We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well.” The thrust of this Information is that Leroy knew the applicable law full well from his practice before appointment to the bench, and that he used his office criminally to legitimize his fellow court officers’ fraud in progress.
The Ontario Judicial Council makes these further observations:
Judges must be impartial and objective in the discharge of their judicial duties.
Judges have a duty to maintain their professional competence in the law.
Judges have a responsibility to inquire whether self-represented persons are aware of their procedural options, and to direct them to available information if they are not.
Judges should make every effort to ensure that their conduct is above reproach in the view of reasonable, fair minded and informed persons.
The Canadian Judicial Council has taken special note of the position of self-representing litigants. Their Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons has these comments:
Judges and court administrators should do whatever is possible to provide a fair and impartial process and prevent an unfair disadvantage to self-represented persons. [Emphasis added here]
Self-represented persons should not be denied relief on the basis of a minor or easily rectified deficiency in their case.
Access to justice for those who represent themselves requires that all aspects of the court process be open, transparent, clearly defined, simple, convenient and accommodating.
Judges and court administrators should meet the needs of self-represented persons for information, referral, simplicity and assistance.
The Canadian Judicial Council said this in Ethical Principles for Judges (1998):
Public confidence in and respect for the judiciary are essential to an effective judicial system and, ultimately, to democracy founded on the rule of law. Many factors, including unfair or uninformed criticism, or simple misunderstanding of the judicial role, can adversely influence public confidence in and respect for the judiciary. Another factor which is capable of undermining public respect and confidence is any conduct of judges, in and out of court, demonstrating a lack of integrity. Judges should, therefore, strive to conduct themselves in a way that will sustain and contribute to public respect and confidence in their integrity, impartiality, and good judgment.
The public will therefore demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function. It will at least demand that they give the appearance of that kind of conduct. They must be and must give the appearance of being an example of impartiality, independence and integrity. What is demanded of them is something far above what is demanded of their fellow citizens. This is eloquently expressed by Professor Y.-M. Morissette:
[translation] [T]he vulnerability of judges is clearly greater than that of the mass of humanity or of “elites” in general: it is rather as if his or her function, which is to judge others, imposed a requirement that he or she remain beyond the judgment of others.
In her speeches, former Chief Justice McLachlin constantly repeated this general principle:
The ability of Canada’s legal system to function effectively and to deliver the kind of justice that Canadians need and deserve depends in large part on the ethical standards of our judges.
[1] R. v. Gray, [1900] 2 Q.B. 36
[2] (2) See [1968] 1 All E.R. 767.
(d) [3] Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Co. [1990] 3 SCR 191
[4] Ottawa Citizen, Dec. 19, 2016
[5] The Law of Contract, 9th. Ed, 1995
[6] Durham Condominium Corporation No. 123 v. Amberwood Investments Limited, 2002 CanLII 44913 (ON CA)
[7] Parkinson et al. v. Reid [1966] SCR 162
[8] Sport Maska Inc. v. Zittrer [1988] 1 S.C.R.
[9] Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6 [2014] 1 SCR 433
[10] Sirros -v- Moore; CA 1974 [1975] QB 118, [1974] 3 All ER 776
[11] R v Dytham [1979] QB 722
[12] R. v. Boulanger [2006] 2 SCR 49
[13] R. v. Briscoe [2010] 1 SCR 411
[14] The King v. Charles Bembridge Caldecott, 387
[15] R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy ([1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER Rep 233)